Back to the WPPSS Future?
Aug. 1st, 2008 10:56 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
webfarmerMost of the nuclear history books I've read are a bit on the old side. Most were done in the 70s and 80s when there was still some interest in the topic. I see that there are some new releases including what appears to be a definitive look at the iconic WPPSS nuclear fiscal disaster in Washington State some years back. That book is "Nuclear Implosions: The Rise and Fall of the Washington Public Power Supply System" (Cambridge University Press, 2008) by Daniel Pope a professor of history at the University of Oregon.
It's a sad story that the oldsters need to recall and the youngsters should be aware of in this new "Renaissance" era. This is especially the case in an era where inflation and perhaps even old time stagflation are looming. This is Pope's quick take on that topic back when a billion was still a lot of money and the nuclear industry was the financial bubble that was bursting. [WPPSS = Whoops!]
A Northwest Distast for Nuclear Power - Seattle Times - 31 Jul 08
"Twenty-five years ago this summer, prospects for a nuclear-powered Northwest imploded. In what was then the nation's largest municipal bond default, the Washington Public Power Supply System told creditors it could not make payment on a $2.25 billion debt it incurred to build two large nuclear plants. Today, as we contemplate regional energy options, the Supply System's abandoned projects still cast a shadow.
In the 1970s, the Supply System (the agency hated the sound of its acronym, WPPSS) had undertaken to build five nuclear plants. A small public agency in Richland, next to the Hanford Reservation, the Supply System began the that decade with only a few dozen employees, although its members came to include major utilities such as Seattle City Light, Tacoma City Light and Snohomish PUD. A decade later, it was the largest public borrower in the nation, with about 14,000 construction workers building its plants."
"The Supply System's 1983 fiasco contains some of the elements of today's unsettled financial markets. The agency assured buyers its bonds were low-risk investments. Wall Street paid little attention to the massive projects themselves or to the disconnect between Bonneville's faulty projections of soaring demand and the region's actual experience. The call today is for financial transparency, so buyers and sellers can evaluate potential risks and rewards clearly. Supply System bond marketing was a study in opacity.
It's a sad story that the oldsters need to recall and the youngsters should be aware of in this new "Renaissance" era. This is especially the case in an era where inflation and perhaps even old time stagflation are looming. This is Pope's quick take on that topic back when a billion was still a lot of money and the nuclear industry was the financial bubble that was bursting. [WPPSS = Whoops!]
A Northwest Distast for Nuclear Power - Seattle Times - 31 Jul 08
"Twenty-five years ago this summer, prospects for a nuclear-powered Northwest imploded. In what was then the nation's largest municipal bond default, the Washington Public Power Supply System told creditors it could not make payment on a $2.25 billion debt it incurred to build two large nuclear plants. Today, as we contemplate regional energy options, the Supply System's abandoned projects still cast a shadow.
In the 1970s, the Supply System (the agency hated the sound of its acronym, WPPSS) had undertaken to build five nuclear plants. A small public agency in Richland, next to the Hanford Reservation, the Supply System began the that decade with only a few dozen employees, although its members came to include major utilities such as Seattle City Light, Tacoma City Light and Snohomish PUD. A decade later, it was the largest public borrower in the nation, with about 14,000 construction workers building its plants."
"The Supply System's 1983 fiasco contains some of the elements of today's unsettled financial markets. The agency assured buyers its bonds were low-risk investments. Wall Street paid little attention to the massive projects themselves or to the disconnect between Bonneville's faulty projections of soaring demand and the region's actual experience. The call today is for financial transparency, so buyers and sellers can evaluate potential risks and rewards clearly. Supply System bond marketing was a study in opacity.
